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There are at least two different aspects of our rational evaluation of agents’ doxastic attitudes (and 
absences thereof). First, we evaluate these attitudes according to whether they are supported by one’s 
evidence. It’s this kind of rational evaluation that’s (usually) at issue when we say that it is irrational to 
deny anthropogenic climate change, or to believe in a flat earth, or to believe that there are fairies 
living at the bottom of your garden. Second, we evaluate these attitudes according to how well they 
cohere with one another. It’s this kind of rational evaluation that’s (usually) at issue when we say that 
it’s irrational to have contradictory or otherwise inconsistent beliefs, or that it’s irrational to have 
credences that violate the probability axioms, or that it’s irrational to believe something that you yourself 
judge yourself not to have good evidence for. 
 The distinction between these two kinds of rational evaluation generalizes beyond doxastic 
attitudes. Assuming that evidential considerations constitute at least one very prominent kind of reason 
for and against doxastic attitudes, failures to correctly respond to one’s evidence are ipso facto failures 
to respond correctly to one’s reasons - just as one can fail to respond correctly to one’s reasons in 
one’s intentions, preferences, hopes, fears, and so on. Call rational evaluations that concern the 
responsiveness of one’s attitudes to one’s reasons evaluations of substantive rationality. Likewise, there 
are many forms of incoherence that involve non-doxastic attitudes: cyclical preferences, inconsistent 
intentions, failures to intend to believed means to one’s ends, and the like. Call rational evaluations 
that concern the coherence of one’s attitudes evaluations of structural rationality. 
 A central question in the theory of rationality is this: are substantive and structural rationality 
really two distinct, sui generis, equally genuine kinds of rationality? Or can one of them be eliminated 
or reduced to (or even shown to be identical to) the other? Call those who take the former view dualists 
about rationality, and those who take the latter view monists about rationality. 
There are many different fronts on which the battle between dualism and monism can be 
waged. But one way to argue for dualism – suggested by my (2018) – is to argue that the requirements 
of substantive and structural rationality can in fact come into conflict. As I’ll explain shortly, if this is 
true, a prominent monist strategy for eliminating sui generis requirements of structural rationality 
immediately fails.  
In this paper, I want to push the dialectic on this issue further forward in two main ways. In 
the first main part of the paper (§§4-5), I’ll revisit conflicts between substantive rationality (reasons-
responsiveness; or, in the doxastic case, evidence-responsiveness) and structural rationality 
(coherence) in more depth. I will discuss two kinds of cases – one that I’ve discussed before in this 
context (cases of misleading higher-order evidence), and one that I haven’t (preface cases). I will argue 
that both cases are can plausibly, but not utterly conclusively, be diagnosed as evidence-coherence (i.e. 
substantive-structural) conflicts. But I’ll also argue – and this goes beyond what I’ve contended even 
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about misleading higher-order evidence cases in the past – that the most plausible ways of resisting the 
diagnosis of these cases as conflict cases still end up diagnosing them in ways that undermines monism. 
 In the second main part of the paper (§§6-7), I’ll suppose for the sake of argument that we 
should understand the relevant cases as conflict cases, and try to say something about what we should 
do if and when such conflicts arise. I demurred from doing this in my earlier work, thinking that there 
is nothing to be said about how such conflicts should be adjudicated. They are, I thought, simply 
dilemmatic, in the strong sense that there is no all-things-considered answer as to what one should do 
in such cases. However, I’ve changed my mind about this, at least in the case of conflicts generated 
by misleading higher-order evidence. I will argue that in those cases, the coherence (structural) 
requirements take precedence over the evidential (substantive) requirements. Unfortunately, however 
(and this is a matter of genuine disappointment to me), the arguments I give for this don’t seem to 
generalize to preface cases. So if preface cases are conflicts of evidence and coherence, I don’t 
(currently) see a way to resist understanding them as dilemmatic in a strong sense.  
First, though, a bit more setup.  
 
1. A slightly more precise fix on substantive rationality 
 
In introducing the distinction between substantive and structural rationality, I said that substantive 
rationality concerns responding correctly to our reasons. But this is somewhat imprecise as it stands. 
It needs two qualifiers.  
 First, substantive rationality does not require responsiveness to reasons that are completely 
outside of one’s epistemic ken. Suppose that $1,000,000 is buried in John’s back yard, but you don’t 
know this and you have no evidence whatsoever that indicates it. There’s perhaps a sense in which 
the fact that $1,000,000 is buried in your back yard is nevertheless a strong reason to (intend to) dig 
up your back yard. But you would, I take it, in no ordinary sense be irrational for failing to do so, given 
that you’re in no epistemic position to appreciate the relevant reason. Similarly, it may make sense to 
talk of reasons for belief that are completely outside of one’s epistemic ken. Suppose that you’re 
investigating Paul’s murder. Suppose further that Ringo stands to inherit all of Paul’s money if Paul 
dies, but you don’t know this and you have no evidence whatsoever that indicates it. There’s perhaps 
a sense in which the fact that Ringo stands to inherit all of Paul’s money if Paul dies is a strong reason 
to believe that Ringo killed Paul. But you would, I take it, in no ordinary sense be irrational to failing 
to believe this, given that you’re in no epistemic position to appreciate the relevant reason.  
So substantive rationality requires you only to respond to the reasons that are, loosely speaking, 
within your epistemic ken. We might express this by saying that substantive rationality requires you 
only to respond to reasons that you “possess”,1 or that it requires you only to respond to your 
“evidence-relative” reasons.2 In the doxastic case, the slogan that (substantive) rationality requires you 
to respond to your evidence already reflects this: it restricts itself to the reasons for belief provided by 
the evidence that you have. 
                                                 
1 Lord 2018. 
2 Kiesewetter 2017. 
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 Some has thought that once we see that rationality requires you only to respond to the reasons 
within your epistemic ken, the distinction between substantive and structural rationality melts away.3 
But this is too hasty. Consider the denier of anthropogenic climate change. Let’s stipulate that this 
person is aware of what is, in fact, decisive evidence against her belief that anthropogenic climate 
change is not real (say, the testimony of experts to the effect that anthropogenic climate change is 
real). In that case, she believes something that her evidence decisively tells against – she is substantively 
irrational. Nevertheless, she might be perfectly structurally rational – her beliefs might be entirely 
consistent, her credences might obey the probability axioms, she might not be defying her own 
judgments about what her evidence supports, and so on.4  
Second, substantive rationality does not require responsiveness to so-called “wrong-kind” 
reasons. The paradigm of a wrong-kind reason for believing p is a financial offer of money to believe 
p. Again, perhaps wrong-kind reasons are genuine normative reasons; I need not take a stand on this. 
But if they are, they don’t bear on the rationality (substantive or otherwise) of believing p.5 Intuitively, 
the fact that you’ve bribed me $1,000,000 to believe that 2+2=5 doesn’t make the belief any less 
irrational; at most it gives me a reason to be irrational. Moreover, wrong-kind reasons are notoriously 
difficult to respond to: it is very hard for me to believe that 2+2=5 on the basis of your bribing me 
$1,000,000 to do so. In light of this, it seems very harsh to say that I’m irrational if I don’t believe that 
2+2=5. The point generalizes the wrong-kind reasons for other attitudes such as intention and 
preference. Again, the slogan that (substantive) rationality requires you to respond to your evidence 
already reflects this, since evidence is the paradigmatic right-kind reason for belief. 
Note that if substantive rationality did require responsiveness to wrong-kind reasons, then it 
would be extremely easy to generate conflicts between substantive and structural rationality. We could 
just dream up a case where you’re offered tons of money to violate a structural requirement. But I 
assume that conflicts between substantive and structural rationality doesn’t come this cheaply. 
Now we can state the claim that substantive rationality requires you to respond correctly to 
your reasons a bit more precisely. Substantive rationality requires you to respond correctly to your 
right-kind, possessed (or evidence-relative) reasons.  
 
2. How substantive-structural conflicts strengthen the case for dualism 
 
Prima facie, substantive and structural rationality seem distinct, and they both seem to pick up on 
genuine features of our talk about rationality. How, then, might one try to be a monist about 
rationality? A recently prominent monist proposal builds on the following hypothesis: 
 
                                                 
3 Wedgwood 2017. 
4 It might now be claimed that since failures to respond correctly to one’s evidence themselves involve a bad of “bad 
relation” between one’s mental states, they are themselves a kind of incoherence. Perhaps there’s a sense of 
‘incoherence’ in which this is true, but I think it’s not the (narrower) sense of ‘incoherence’ that grounds structural 
irrationality. See Worsnip (forthcoming: chapter 1) for more. 
5 Cf. Kelly 2002; Schroeder 2012. 
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The Guarantee Hypothesis. For any set of attitudinal mental states6 {A1…An} of the kind 
associated with structural irrationality, it is guaranteed that at least one of {A1…An} is 
substantively irrational.7 
 
What does it mean for it to be “guaranteed” that at least one of {A1…An} is substantively irrational? 
As I understand it, the idea is this: that for each of the possible ways that an agent’s reasons could be, 
ranging across all (metaphysically) possible worlds and all possible agents, at least one of {A1…An} 
would be substantively irrational. Thus, the hypothesis says that, for any incoherent set of attitudinal 
mental states of the sort associated with structural rationality, there is no possible world such that all 
of these states are substantively rational. Thus, holding these states will always involve one in 
substantive irrationality. 
An illustrative example of this hypothesis is provided by contradictory beliefs. It’s fairly 
plausible that, whenever one believes p and believes not-p, at least one of these beliefs must be 
insufficiently supported by one’s (evidence-relative) reasons. For all possible ways that one’s reasons 
could be, none involve one’s reasons sufficiently supporting both beliefs. The Guarantee Hypothesis 
tries to extend this thought to all structurally irrational combinations of attitudinal mental states. 
If the Guarantee Hypothesis is correct, then a major upshot of this is that (would-be) 
requirements of structural rationality are normatively superfluous, in the sense that they do not add 
anything to the demands of structural rationality. Any total state that (so-called) structural rationality 
forbids is already forbidden by substantive rationality. For example, since for any contradictory pair 
of beliefs, at least one of them is already forbidden by substantive rationality, any further structural 
requirement forbidding one from believing contradictions would be superfluous. This, the proponents 
of the Guarantee Hypothesis think, means that we can eliminate these requirements of structural 
rationality as sui generis, distinct requirements. We can account for the intuition that it’s irrational to be 
incoherent while positing only requirements of substantive rationality. 
 But suppose that there are conflicts between substantive and structural rationality, where each 
attitudinal mental state in some set {A1…An} is substantively required, but the set as a whole is 
structurally prohibited. In that case, it immediately follows that the Guarantee Hypothesis is false, 
since the set is structurally irrational without any of its members being substantively irrational. (Call 
such cases, then, conflict counterexamples to the Guarantee Hypothesis). Thus, conflicts between 
structural and substantive rationality would close off one of the most prominent and plausible routes 
to monism.  
 All of this said, it’s worth me being up front that my ultimate interest is in defending dualism 
(and rejecting monism), not in establishing the existence of conflicts per se. And importantly, there are 
at least two ways in which putative conflict cases might turn out to threaten monism even if they aren’t 
ultimately judged to be conflict cases. 
 First, suppose that it turns out that the right diagnosis of the case is that at least some of 
{A1…An} are not substantive required, but merely substantively permitted. Nevertheless, if every 
attitudinal mental state in the set is substantively permitted, but the set as a whole is structurally 
                                                 
6 I’ll use this term throughout to refer to both attitudes and absences thereof. 
7 See Kolodny (2007, 2008a, 2008b), Kiesewetter (2017), and Lord (2018). 
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prohibited, the Guarantee Hypothesis fails, and the route to monism is again blocked. Call this a 
permissive counterexample to the Guarantee Hypothesis. 
 Second, suppose that it turns out that the right diagnosis of the case is that substantive 
rationality actually forbids at least one of the attitudes in the set – but the explanation of why this is so 
invokes facts about the coherence, or structural irrationality, of the set. For example, suppose the 
explanation is that there is a fundamental constraint on reasons that says that, if some combination of 
responses violate a prior, sui generis requirement of structural rationality, then our reasons can’t demand 
that we have all of these responses. If this were so, then the case would not be a counterexample to 
the Guarantee Hypothesis, but it would show that the Guarantee Hypothesis can no longer be used 
to plausibly eliminate distinctive requirements of structural rationality. For those very requirements 
would then turn out to be explanatorily fundamental in explaining why the Guarantee Hypothesis 
holds, and why conflict and permissive counterexamples to it can’t come about. Call any case like this 
a fundamentality objection case. 
 These other possibilities are important. For I’m going to argue soon that the most plausible 
ways of resisting the claim that putative conflict cases really are conflict cases end up falling into one 
of the above categories – thus still undermining monism, or at least versions of it that go via the 
Guarantee Hypothesis.8 
 
3. “Epistemic dilemmas” 
 
One final point before I get into the core of the argument. The volume of which this paper is a part 
is called Epistemic Dilemmas. Are evidence-coherence conflicts epistemic dilemmas? In a loose sense, 
they obviously are. But I am going to stipulate some terminology to be a bit more precise. Let’s say 
that there one is in a conflict when one is under two competing requirements that are impossible to 
jointly satisfy.9 And let’s say that one is in a dilemma when there’s no answer to be had as to which of 
the two competing requirements one (all-things-considered) ought to prioritize satisfying in such a 
conflict case. It’s an open question whether evidence-coherence conflicts are dilemmas in this strong 
sense. I’ll come back to this question in section 6. 
 Moreover, even if they are dilemmas, there is a sense in which describing them as epistemic 
dilemmas may be misleading. For, at least in my opinion, the requirements of structural rationality on 
doxastic states aren’t epistemic requirements in the strictest sense of the term.10 Let me explain. 
 In one sense of the term ‘epistemic’ – which is fairly common, but not very faithful to the 
etymology of the term – an epistemic requirement is just any requirement on doxastic states such as 
                                                 
8 Notice that I’ve said in this section only that conflict cases strengthen the case for dualism by undermining the 
particular version of monism that goes via the guarantee hypothesis. There is a different kind of monism, advanced by 
Maria Lasonen-Aarnio (2020, forthcoming) that (perhaps surprisingly) actually allows for evidence-coherence conflicts. I 
argue against Lasonen-Aarnio’s version of monism elsewhere (Worsnip forthcoming: §3.7). 
9 This usage is not so weak that it’ll describe any kind of opposing pro tanto reasons as a conflict. For example, suppose I 
have a weak reason to jump from a 50-story building, which is that it will give me a momentary thrill, and a very strong 
reason not to jump, which is that it will kill me. I take it this is not a conflict in any interesting sense. To have a conflict, 
the two competing normative considerations must amount to requirements. Though jumping from the building would give 
me a thrill, there’s no requirement to do so in virtue of this. 
10 Cf. Easwaran & Fitelson (2015) and Smithies (this volume), both of whom describe them as “epistemic requirements”. 
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belief and credence. Clearly, requirements of structural rationality on doxastic states are epistemic 
requirements in this loose sense.11 
However, in a stricter sense, epistemic requirements are ones that in some way connect with 
truth or knowledge, and have to be justified in those terms. For example, on one picture, it has to be 
shown that obeying these requirements will somehow conduce to true belief or to knowledge. But this 
stacks the deck against those who think that the structural requirements are just sui generis requirements 
to have attitudes that make coherent internal sense, not to be justified in terms of some further end, 
either epistemic or practical. For this reason, I prefer not to call them epistemic requirements, and so 
in a pedantic sense the conflicts I’m describing aren’t distinctively epistemic conflicts (or dilemmas). It 
may be that the only specifically epistemic rational requirements, strictly speaking, are the substantive 
ones that require responsiveness to one’s evidence. But, I contend, these are not the only rational 
requirements on doxastic states. 
 
4. Preface cases 
 
What I will call “preface cases” are cases based on the structure of the preface paradox.12 The essential 
structure of these cases are as follows. You believe a large set of propositions {p1, p2, … pn}. You 
have strong evidence for each of these propositions taken individually – enough to make the 
probability of each proposition, given your evidence, very high. However, for each proposition, this 
evidence still leaves open a small evidential probability that the proposition is false. Now consider the 
conjunctive proposition (p1 & p2 & … pn). The risks of error for each individual proposition aggregate 
for the conjunctive proposition, such that the evidential probability of the conjunctive proposition is 
very low (given a suitably large n, and given at least some probabilistic independence between the 
individual propositions). 
 What should we say about such a case? Let’s start with substantive rationality. I take the 
following verdicts to be very hard to resist: 
 
(1) For each individual proposition in the set {p1, p2, … pn}, believing this proposition is 
substantively permissible. 
(2) Believing the conjunctive proposition (p1 & p2 & … pn) is substantively impermissible. 
 
The propositions in the set {p1, p2, … pn} are all ones that are highly probable on one’s evidence, but 
that fall short of having probability 1 on one’s evidence. (1) follows straightaway if there is some 
threshold of evidential probability, short of 1, that suffices for rational belief. But, of course, it’s 
                                                 
11 Though, it’s worth noting that at least in my view, the requirements of structural rationality on doxastic states are very 
much of a piece with the requirements of structural rationality on practical or conative states, such as the requirement 
not to have cyclical preferences or inconsistent intentions. The kind of failing involved in violating these various 
requirement is of exactly the same kind: it involves having mental states that don’t fit together with one another in the 
right ways. It’s also notable that there are many requirements of structural rationality that prohibit combinations of 
doxastic and conative states – for example, the requirement that prohibits {believing you ought not Ф, intending to Ф} –  
and so wouldn’t neatly count either as epistemic or practical requirements on this way of talking. 
12 The preface paradox was introduced by Makinson (1965). Important contributions to the contemporary debate about 
it include, inter alia, Ryan (1991), Kaplan (1996: ch. 4), and Christensen (2004: chs. 3-4). 
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controversial whether this is so. Maybe there are other conditions on rational belief that a proposition 
with very high evidential probability doesn’t always meet.13 No matter, though. As long as there are 
some propositions14 that don’t enjoy evidential probability 1 but that it’s substantively rational to 
believe, we can just stipulate, for the purposes of setting up the case, {p1, p2, … pn} are all propositions 
of this kind. The claim that there are at least some propositions that don’t enjoy evidential probability 
1 but that it’s substantively rational to believe follows from a very modest kind of fallibilism, according 
to which the absolute certainty of p on one’s evidence isn’t a necessary condition for rational belief in 
p.15 I think this very modest fallibilism is overwhelmingly plausible, and I will take it for granted here. 
Thus, (1) can be assumed too. 
(2) follows from the assumption that it can’t be substantively permissible to believe something 
that is very improbable on one’s evidence. This is overwhelmingly plausible,16 and I will take it for 
granted here. 
 I’ll come back to some bolder claims about substantive rationality in a moment. First, though, 
what about structural rationality? There are two putative requirements of structural rationality that 
might be relevant here: 
 
Deductive Closure Constraint. Where some set of beliefs S entail some proposition q, structural 
rationality prohibits {having each belief in S, not believing q}. 
 
Consistency Constraint. Structural rationality prohibits having a set of beliefs S that is 
inconsistent.17 
 
As a matter of fact, I think that preface cases put considerable pressure on us to deny the Deductive 
Closure Constraint even as a requirement of purely structural rationality. I’ve argued more for this elsewhere,18 
but briefly, the thought is this. Suppose you believe each of {p1, p2, … pn}, without having credence 
1 in them. Assuming structural rationality requires at least approximate probabilistic coherence, you 
will be structurally irrational if you don’t assign the conjunction (p1 & p2 & … pn) a low credence 
(assuming that {p1, p2, … pn} are at least fairly probabilistically independent). But, if the Deductive 
Closure Constraint is true, you will be structurally irrational unless you believe (p1 & p2 & … pn). Thus, 
it seems that if the Deductive Closure Constraint is true, structural rationality requires you to believe 
                                                 
13 For example, maybe one’s evidence for it has to be “individualized” or not “merely statistical” in some sense (cf. e.g. 
Thomson 1986; Buchak 2014), that it meets a safety condition (cf. e.g. Enoch, Spectre & Fisher 2012), or that the stakes 
with respect to it have to be adequately low (cf. e.g. Fantl & McGrath 2002). 
14 Or, more precisely, a non-trivial number of suitably independent propositions. 
15 Timothy Williamson is often understood as denying this, holding that it is, in fact, substantively impermissible to 
believe something that lacks evidential probability 1. While this may be true of the recent work of his, e.g. Williamson 
forthcoming, it is actually not interpretatively correct as regards his classic Knowledge and its Limits, where he explicitly 
affirms that one can justifiably believe falsehoods, which cannot have evidential probability 1; see Williamson 2000: 9. 
For a systematic defense of the view that one can justifiably believe that which is not certain on one’s evidence, see 
Brown (2018). 
16 Pace Kaplan (1996). I have argued against Kaplan’s view elsewhere (Worsnip 2016). 
17 Either constraint can be weakened to refer only to recognized entailments or inconsistencies. I will ignore that 
complication here, since nothing turns on it for my purposes. 
18 Worsnip 2016, Worsnip (forthcoming: §9.4). 
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something for which you have (if you are otherwise structurally rational) a low credence (or to give up 
your initial beliefs {p1, p2, … pn}).
19 But this seems wrong; on the contrary, it actually seems structurally 
irrational to believe something for which one has a low (<0.5) credence. For given that believing 
something involving judging it to be true, it is incoherent to believe something while judging it to be 
more likely to be false than true. Thus, we should reject the Deductive Closure Constraint. 
 Note that this argument does not appeal to any requirements of substantive rationality, or tacitly 
assume the impossibility of conflicts between the substantive and the structural. It works purely 
internally to structural rationality, appealing to other structural constraints such as probabilistic 
coherence and the constraint that you not believe something for which you have low (<0.5) credence, 
and suggesting that the Deductive Closure Constraint would effectively require you to violate one of 
these constraints. 
 However, this argument doesn’t extend to call the Consistency Constraint into doubt.20 The 
fundamental reason for this is that, whereas it is structurally irrational to believe something that you 
have a low credence for (specifically, any credence < 0.5), it isn’t structurally irrational to fail to believe 
something that you have a very high (but non-1) credence for. Thus, no matter how high your credence 
in the negation of the conjunction gets, failing to believe the negation of the conjunction won’t result 
in any structural irrationality (though it may, if your credence is justified, perhaps be substantively 
irrational). Thus, I don’t think that preface cases show that it’s not structurally irrational to have 
inconsistent beliefs. The Consistency Constraint remains plausible.21 Or, to put the point more 
neutrally in the dialectic with the monist who argues for her view via the Guarantee Hypothesis: 
inconsistency is the sort of pattern associated with structural irrationality that the Guarantee Hypothesis 
should want to account for the irrationality of.  
 Let’s assume, then, that the Consistency Constraint holds. What we would need to generate a 
conflict counterexample to the Guarantee Hypothesis, then, are the following two claims, bolder than 
(1) and (2) above:22 
 
(3) For each individual proposition in the set {p1, p2, … pn}, believing this proposition is 
substantively required. 
(4) Believing the negation of the conjunctive proposition (p1 & p2 & … pn) is substantively required. 
 
If (3) and (4), are true, then we’re required to believe each proposition in the set {p1, p2, … pn}, but 
also to believe the negation of the conjunction of these propositions. Since the total set containing 
{p1, p2, … pn} plus the negation of their conjunction is inconsistent, this would generate a conflict 
                                                 
19 This last parenthetical is needed on the assumption that requirements of structural rationality are “wide-scope” (cf. 
e.g., Broome 2004). I take it that the parenthetical this doesn’t make things much better. {p1, p2, … pn} were just 
arbitrary beliefs that you have but lack credence in 1. So saying that one is required to give them up would amount to 
saying that one ought not to have any non-trivial number of beliefs that one lacks credence 1 in. Thus, saying that one is 
required either to believe the conjunctive proposition or to give up one’s initial beliefs amounts to saying that one is 
required either to believe something for which one has a very low credence or not to have any non-trivial number of 
beliefs that one lacks credence 1 in. This is still a very bad result.   
20 I failed to advertise this fact in Worsnip (2016). 
21 Or, again, at least a version of it that refers to sets of beliefs one recognizes to be inconsistent does.  
22 Cf., MacFarlane (ms.), who explicitly takes the view that preface cases are conflict cases. 
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between substantive rationality and structural rationality (assuming that the Consistency Constraint is 
a requirement of structural rationality). 
If there is some fixed (non-1) threshold of evidential probability, t, above which one is always 
required to believe a proposition, then it is impossible to resist (3) and (4) – at least given a suitably 
chosen set {p1, p2, … pn}, where each proposition’s evidential probability exceeds t, but n is large 
enough such that the probability of the negation of the conjunction also exceeds t. However, this view 
about when we’re required to believe things is, obviously, controversial. It might, then, be thought 
that it is easy to save the Guarantee Hypothesis from preface-based counterexamples: we just need to 
deny this threshold-based view about when we’re rationally required to believe things. 
However, let’s consider what the alternatives are. Even if we reject (3), I have already argued 
that we should accept (1), namely the claim that for each proposition {p1, p2, … pn}, believing the 
proposition is substantively permitted. What about if we reject (4)? Suppose we reject (4) but still 
accept: 
 
(5) Believing the negation of the conjunctive proposition (p1 & p2 & … pn) is substantively 
permitted.23 
 
Given (1) and (5), the preface case turns out to be a permissive counterexample to the Guarantee 
Hypothesis. For it would still be a case in which it’s substantively permissible to have every belief in the 
total set containing {p1, p2, … pn} plus the negation of their conjunction. Nevertheless, this total set 
would result in one’s violating the Consistency Constraint. So the case would still show that one’s 
violating the Consistency Constraint does not guarantee that one has thereby violated a requirement 
of substantive rationality. And with this, it would be a counterexample to the Guarantee Hypothesis, 
even though it’s not a conflict counterexample to it. 
 The only other option is: 
 
(6) Believing the negation of the conjunctive proposition (p1 & p2 & … pn) is substantively 
prohibited.24 
 
If this is right, then the preface case is neither a conflict counterexample nor a permissive 
counterexample to the Guarantee Hypothesis. 
 What could motivate (6), though? That is: why does substantive irrationality forbid you from 
believing the negation of the conjunction, even though its probability on your evidence is very high? 
And here I think the only forthcoming answer is: because doing so would lead you into irrationality! 
But if this is so, then structural rationality is effectively putting a constraint on substantive rationality: 
because inconsistent beliefs are irrational, our theory of substantive rationality is being constrained so 
as not to permit all of them. Since {p1, p2, … pn} are just arbitrary propositions that we can stipulate 
                                                 
23 One, but not the only, way to motivate this view would be to hold that it’s never rationally required to believe a 
proposition that has a probability short of 1. On this view, cases of high but not-1 probability are permissive cases, 
where one may permissibly believe or permissibly suspend judgment. Cf. Nelson (2010). 
24 Combined with (2), this entails that the only permissible attitude to take toward the conjunctive proposition (and its 
negation) is to suspend judgment on it. 
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that it’s substantively rational to believe, the only way to do this is to forbid belief in the negation of 
the conjunction.  
Thus, on this diagnosis, the preface case turns out to be what I earlier called a fundamentality 
objection case. In such a case, the Guarantee Hypothesis is saved from counterexample only by 
making a requirement of structural rationality (viz. the Consistency Constraint) fundamental to the 
explanation of why it holds, by putting a constraint on substantive rationality. This undermines the 
attempt to eliminate structural rationality or its requirements, as the monist wants to do. 
I have no settled view on which of the above views is the right one (beyond insisting on the 
truth of (1) and (2). But I have argued that for all the logically possible ways of diagnosing the case, it 
turns out either to be a conflict counterexample, a permissive counterexample, or a fundamentality 
objection case. All three of these possibilities foreclose the possibility of monism. If my argument is 
sound, the only way for the monist to reply would be to simply deny that inconsistent beliefs are 
irrational in any sense of the term ‘irrational’, and to exclude them from the set of “attitudes associated 
with structural irrationality” that the Guarantee Hypothesis was supposed to account for. But this 
should at the very least be a disappointment for the monist, who would – I take it – have hoped to 
include inconsistent beliefs among the patterns of irrational attitudes that she can account for by 
appeal to the Guarantee Hypothesis. Strict logical inconsistency of belief is, after all, perhaps the 
paradigm case of incoherence.  
Of could, the monist could just insist that the preface case itself undermines the Consistency 
Constraint. But I think this begs the question. Let me explain. 
Suppose we didn’t have the possibility of dualism about rationality in view. We might then – 
as many epistemologists have done – assume that having doxastic attitudes that are supported by the 
evidence on its own is not just necessary but also sufficient for those doxastic attitudes being rational 
(since we would be ignoring the possibility of sui generis coherence requirements that go beyond the 
requirement to believe what one’s evidence supports). Turning to the preface case, then, we might 
think that if one’s evidence at least adequately supports each of the relevant jointly inconsistent beliefs, 
then it straightaway follows that inconsistent beliefs can be fully rational, and that there’s no kind of 
consistency requirement on belief.25  
But once the dualist view is on the table as an option, this is too quick. The dualist posits 
separate coherence (structural) requirements on belief that may add to the demands of substantive 
rationality, that is, of evidence-responsiveness. So if dualism is a live possibility, we cannot conclude 
simply from the fact that each of the inconsistent beliefs is supported by the evidence that it is not 
irrational in any sense (even a structural one) to have inconsistent beliefs. It may be that the 
inconsistent beliefs are substantively permissible, but not structurally permissible. (This need not, it 
bears stressing, automatically amount to positing a conflict between substantive and structural 
rationality. As we’ve seen, this follows only given the further, bolder claim that the inconsistent beliefs 
are substantively required.) 
 So we now see that the argument against the Consistency Constraint from preface cases turns 
on the monist assumption that the evidential requirements on belief are the only rational requirements 
                                                 
25 Cf., e.g., Christensen (2004). 
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on belief, and that there are no sui generis structural requirements.26 Thus, to insist on it in defense of 
monism against the challenge I’ve made to it would simply beg the question. 
 
5. Misleading higher-order evidence cases 
 
Let’s now turn to cases of misleading higher-order evidence. Higher-order evidence is evidence about 
your evidence (either about what your evidence is, or what it supports). But higher-order evidence can 
be misleading. Consider, for example, the following case (from Worsnip 2018):27 
 
Miss Marple and Mabel. Miss Marple is a detective who is famously good at assessing 
evidence. Miss Marple is investigating a murder that took place at the mansion on the hill, and 
she takes her great niece Mabel along with her. Miss Marple and Mabel set about the mansion 
collecting clues. Unfortunately, in their initial sweep of the house, nothing that they learn 
offers any kind of significant support to any particular hypothesis about who committed the 
crime. As part of her training of Mabel as her apprentice, after they have finished examining a 
crime scene, Miss Marple always tells Mabel her own assessment of what the evidence 
supports. On this occasion, Miss Marple makes an uncharacteristic error, and declares to 
Mabel, “the clues lying around the house that you have seen up to this point support believing 
that the vicar did it.” 
 
Here’s what should be fairly uncontroversial in this case. First, taken on their own the clues do not 
support believing (the first-order proposition) that the vicar did it. Second, taken on its own Miss 
Marple’s testimony supports believing (the higher-order proposition) that the clues support believing 
that the vicar did it. In that sense, the case involves misleading higher-order evidence. 
But the controversial question, for the debate about higher-order evidence, is what to say 
about what the total evidence supports in this case. Let’s say that the case is a case of all-things-considered 
misleading higher-order evidence if one’s total evidence (clues + testimony) supports believing a 
falsehood about what one’s total evidence (clues + testimony) supports.  
Such cases, if they exist, can generate conflicts between substantive and structural rationality. 
Consider again the Miss Marple & Mabel case. Suppose that Mabel’s total evidence (decisively28) 
supports suspending judgment about whether the vicar did it. Then: 
 
(7) Mabel is substantively prohibited from believing that the vicar did it. 
 
                                                 
26 In this way, it’s unlike the argument against the Deductive Closure Constraint from preface cases that I myself 
endorsed above. As I was at pains to point out, that argument works purely internally to structural rationality, and makes 
no tacit monist assumptions. But it doesn’t extend to the Consistency Constraint. 
27 See also Coates (2012) and Horowitz (2014) for similar cases. 
28 By ‘decisively’ supporting p, I mean that it supports it in such a way as to make believing p substantively required, not 
just substantively permissible. We could talk of ‘adequately’ supporting p to refer to support that makes believing p 
substantively permissible. Of course, on non-permissivist theories, decisively and adequate support are one and the same 
thing, and we can omit these qualifiers. 
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But suppose that Mabel’s total evidence (decisively) supports believing that her total evidence 
(decisively) supports believing that the vicar did it. Then: 
 
(8) Mabel is substantively required to believe that her total evidence (decisively) supports believing 
that the vicar did it. 
 
However, the following is very plausibly a requirement of structural rationality: 
 
Inter-Level Coherence (Pos).29 Structural rationality prohibits {believing that your total 
evidence decisively supports believing p, not believing p}.30 
 
If (7) and (8) are true, then substantive rationality requires Mabel to violate Inter-Level Coherence, 
and so we have a conflict counterexample to the Guarantee Hypothesis. 
 Now, it is difficult to conclusively establish that the Miss Marple and Mabel case, as described, 
is a case of all-things-considered misleading higher-order evidence, and hence that in this case as it is 
described. After all, Miss Marple’s testimony is not just evidence for the higher-order proposition that 
the evidence supports believing that the vicar did it. It is also at least some evidence for the first-order 
proposition that the vicar did it. When Miss Marple says that the evidence supports p, that’s some 
indication not just that the evidence supports p, but also that p. (Moreover, slightly more arguably, the 
clues themselves may constitute some evidence against the higher-order proposition that the evidence 
supports believing that the vicar did it.) Whether the case constitutes an example of all-things-
considered misleading higher-order evidence thus depends on the exact relative weights of the clues 
and the testimony, first, at the level of the first-order proposition that the vicar did it, and second, at 
the level of the higher-order proposition that the evidence supports believing that the vicar did it. And 
those exact relative weights are hard to specify. 
 However, in my (2018), I offered the following argument that at least some cases of all-things-
considered misleading higher-order evidence should be possible. Though Miss Marple’s testimony has 
some weight at the level of both the higher-order proposition and the first-order proposition, it should 
normally have more weight at the level of the higher-order proposition than at the level of the first-
order proposition. After all, what Miss Marple says is that the evidence supports believing that the 
vicar did it. Intuitively, this bears more directly on the proposition that the evidence supports believing 
that the vicar did it than it does on the proposition that the vicar did it. So Miss Marple’s testimony is 
more weighty at the level of the higher-order proposition than it is at the level of the first-order 
proposition.  
 If you doubt that testimony of the sort that Miss Marple gives (or any evidence at all) could 
be more weighty at the level of the higher-order proposition than it is at the level of the first-order 
proposition, consider the following related case. Suppose there is an epistemic oracle that you know 
                                                 
29 I call it ‘pos’ to distinguish it from the (equally plausible) negative inter-level coherence requirement that prohibits 
{believing that your total evidence doesn’t adequately support believing p, believing p}. This principles can generate 
substantive-structural conflicts in roughly the same way, but it’s the positive principle we need for the Miss Marple and 
Mabel case specifically. 
30 I argue for this principle in Worsnip (2018). 
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to be infallible. But the epistemic oracle only ever tells you about higher-order facts about what your 
total evidence supports; it never just directly tells you the first-order facts. Suppose the epistemic 
oracle tells you that your evidence supports believing that the vicar did it. If the epistemic oracle really 
is infallible, and you can be certain of this, then the probability on your evidence that the evidence 
supports believing that the vicar did it is 1. But is the probability on your evidence that the vicar did it 
1? No. For the oracle’s infallibility consists only in its always delivering truths about what the evidence 
supports. And evidence is sometimes misleading.31 So even given the oracle’s infallibility, and the fact 
that the oracle says that your evidence supports believing that the vicar did it, there is still some non-
zero probability that the vicar didn’t in fact do it.  
Now, the oracle case is not itself a case of misleading total evidence about what your total 
evidence supports.32 But it does illustrate how testimony, or higher-order evidence more generally, can 
probabilify a higher-order proposition more strongly than it probabilifies a first-order proposition. 
Given the oracle’s testimony, the probability of the higher-order proposition that the evidence 
supports believing that the vicar did it is 1, but the probability of the first-order proposition that the 
vicar did it falls short of 1. And this result continues to hold when we relax the assumption of 
infallibility that’s built into the oracle case, and switch to a case where the testifier is just extremely 
reliable. Elementary calculations show that, if we set up the prior probabilities in the right way, Miss 
Marple’s testimony can also probabilify the higher-order proposition that the evidence supports 
believing that the vicar did it to a higher degree than it probabilifies the first-order proposition that 
the vicar did it (see Worsnip 2019 for the details). 
 Suppose, then, that Miss Marple’s testimony is more weighty at the level of the higher-order 
proposition than the first-order proposition. This suggests that it should at least in principle be possible 
for Miss Marple’s testimony to be decisive with respect to the higher-order proposition (that the 
evidence supports believing that the vicar did it) – that is, to make it probable enough to be worthy of 
belief – without being decisive with respect to the first-order proposition (that the vicar did it). It 
won’t just automatically be true that whenever it’s weighty enough to be decisive with respect to the 
higher-order proposition, it’s weighty enough to be decisive with respect to the first-order proposition. 
Of course, whether Miss Marple’s testimony actually is decisive with respect to the higher-order 
proposition, but not the first-order proposition, in any particular concrete instance of the case depends 
on how the case is filled in. In particular, it depends on how much evidence is needed for rational 
belief (in the relevant context), as well as how evidentially probable the relevant propositions are 
before Miss Marple’s testimony. But if Miss Marple’s testimony is more weighty with respect to the 
higher-order proposition than it is with respect to the first-order proposition, we should expect there 
to be some version of the case where it is decisive with respect to the former but not with respect to 
the latter. Thus we should expect there to be at least some precisification of the Miss Marple and 
                                                 
31 I’m not begging the question here. What’s at issue is whether one’s total evidence can mislead about what one’s total 
evidence supports. But it’s common ground that you can sometimes get misleading evidence about ordinary first-order 
propositions like whether the vicar did it. 
32 The reason is this. In this case, when the oracle says that that the evidence supports believing that the vicar did it, this 




Marple case this is a case of all-things-considered misleading higher-order evidence, where (7) and (8) 
are true.33 If so, these will be conflict counterexamples to the Guarantee Hypothesis. 
 Now, just as in preface cases, one might push back against this diagnosis. The foregoing tacitly 
assumed that, if the higher-order proposition that the evidence supports believing that the vicar did it 
is more probable on the evidence than the first-order proposition that the vicar did it, then at least in 
principle, one might be substantively required to believe the former proposition while being 
substantively required not to believe the latter. However, again, if it’s not the case that there’s some 
fixed threshold of evidential probability above which one is substantively required to believe a 
proposition, then there is some room to question this.34 
 As in the preface case, however, I now want to argue that one can save the case from counting 
as a conflict counterexample only at the expense of turning it into a permissive counterexample or a 
fundamentality objection case. Suppose first that one holds that even though the higher-order 
proposition is very probable, Mabel is not substantively required to believe it, but merely permitted to 
do so. Then we replace (8) with: 
 
(9) Mabel is substantively permitted to believe that her total evidence (decisively) supports 
believing that the vicar did it. 
 
But then the case is a permissive counterexample to the guarantee hypothesis. For it would still be 
substantively permissible for Mabel to {believe that her total evidence (decisively) supports believing 
that the vicar did it, not believe that the vicar did it}, and thus to be structurally irrational. The problem 
likewise remains if we also say that believing that the vicar did it is not forbidden, but merely not 
required, such that we replace (7) with: 
 
(10) Mabel is substantively permitted to believe that the vicar did it, and substantively 
permitted not to believe that the vicar did it. 
 
For even if this is so, it would still be substantively permissible for Mabel to {believe that her total 
evidence (decisively) supports believing that the vicar did it, not believe that the vicar did it}. 
 The only way to avoid diagnosing the case as a counterexample to the guarantee hypothesis 
would be either to claim that Mabel’s potential higher-order belief (viz. that the total evidence supports 
believing that the vicar did it) and her potential first-order belief (viz. that the vicar did it) are either 
both substantively required, or that they are both substantively prohibited. But, again, what would explain 
why this has to be so, given that the higher-order proposition is more probable on Mabel’s evidence 
than the first-order proposition is? Again, I think the only forthcoming answer seems to be: because 
structural rationality puts some kind of constraint on what substantive rationality permits.35 So, for 
example, perhaps the reason why it can’t be substantively rational for Mabel to suspend judgment on 
                                                 
33 For another defense of the possibility of all-things-considered misleading higher-order evidence, see Lasonen-Aarnio 
(2020). 
34 See Lord (2018: 60) for this response to my case. Ram Neta also suggested the same thing to me independently.  
35 Cf. Neta (2018: 327). 
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whether the vicar did it is precisely because doing so would make her inter-level incoherent, and thus 
structurally irrational. If we invoke this explanation, then again, the case becomes a fundamentality 
objection case. But without such an explanation, it looks like a miraculous or magical coincidence that 
even though the higher-order proposition is more probable than the first-order proposition on 
Mabel’s evidence, their normative status (as substantively required or prohibited) must travel along 
together in every possible precisification of the case.  
One popular strategy for trying to explain why the normative status of higher-order and first-
order beliefs must travel together – which avoids appealing to any fundamental claims about structural 
rationality – is to appeal to some view about “higher-order defeat” according to which, if one has a 
justified higher-order belief that one’s first-order belief is unjustified, then this defeats the justification 
one has for one’s first-order belief, or provides reason to suspend judgment at the first-order level.36 
This may work for cases where one has first-order evidence that supports believing p, but has a 
justified (but false) higher-order belief that one’s first-order evidence doesn’t support believing p. But it 
response doesn’t generalize to cover the Miss Marple and Mabel case, where things are the other way 
round: the first-order evidence doesn’t support believing p (i.e., that the vicar did it) in the first instance, 
and Mabel’s justified (but false) higher-order belief is that this evidence does support believing p. 
There’s no justification for (first-order) believing for this justified higher-order belief to defeat.37 
Similarly, what’s needed to line up the justificatory status of one’s higher-order and first-order beliefs 
are reasons to believe, not reasons to suspend (at the first-order level). So this explanation of the case 
won’t work. 
 Just like in the preface case, then, the diagnosis of Mabel’s case as a conflict counterexample 
can only be avoided by turning it into a permissive counterexample or a fundamentality objection case. 
One way or another, again, the case spells trouble for monism. 
 Once again, the defender of monism could claim that cases of misleading higher-order 
evidence provide us with reason to simply reject Inter-Level Coherence as a requirement of rationality, 
structural or otherwise.38 But as in the preface case, this begs the question. If believing what one’s 
evidence supports sufficed for rationality, as the monist holds, then it would follow from the existence 
of cases where one’s evidence supports a falsehood about what one’s evidence supports that one can 
rationally violate Inter-Level Coherence. But with dualism on the table as a live option, this inference 
doesn’t go through. It may be that one can violate Inter-Level Coherence without substantive 
irrationality, but that it is still structurally irrational to do so.  
                                                 
36 Bergmann 2005, Skipper 2019, González de Prado 2020, Lord & Sylvan 2021. 
37 Could we say that the justified higher-order belief defeats Mabel’s justification for suspending judgment that the vicar did 
it? In order for this to prevent the case from being a conflict or permissive case, it would have to make it the case that 
Mabel now is justified in believing that the vicar did it. But this stretches the notion of defeat, which – not coincidentally 
– is almost always applied to beliefs rather than to suspended judgment. One can have defeat of one’s justification for 
believing p (that does not constitute evidence against p), that returns one to a “default state” whereby suspending 
judgment is the rational response. But it’s dubious that one can have defeat of one’s justification for suspending judgment 
about p (that does not constitute evidence for p), that thereby makes it rational to believe p. Believing is not a default state 
in the way that suspending judgment is: whereas a mere absence of reasons to believe make suspending judgment 
rational, a mere absence of reasons to suspend cannot make belief rational; only adequate evidence for p can do that. 
38 Cf. Coates (2012); Lasonen-Aarnio (2020). 
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 There’s one other way to for the monist to try to resist the challenge from higher-order 
evidence cases that wasn’t available in preface cases. I’ve presumed, in presenting the Miss Marple and 
Mabel case, that Miss Marple’s testimony that the clues support believing the vicar did it has evidential 
weight, and that they could in principle make it the case that substantive rationality requires or at least 
permits Mabel to believe that her total evidence supports believing that the vicar did it (even if. But a 
very extreme a priorist view denies this.39 This view holds that evidential support relations are a priori, 
and moreover (and more strongly) that in virtue of this, Mabel possesses indefeasible a priori justification 
for true beliefs (and against false beliefs) about what her evidence supports, that cannot be defeated 
by any misleading empirical evidence (e.g. testimony) to the contrary. If this is so, then as long as 
Mabel’s total evidence doesn’t support believing that the vicar did it, she cannot be substantively 
required or even permitted to believe that her total evidence doesn’t support believing that the vicar 
did it. 
 Even granting that evidential support relations are wholly a priori, I find the view that we enjoy 
indefeasible justification for a priori questions, that can never be empirically defeated, wild. On this 
view, I should be completely certain in all the epistemological, moral, and more generally a priori 
philosophical truths – some of the hardest and most disputed questions there are in the canons of 
human thought. However, even if this view were plausible, there is a further issue for this strategy. 
Cases of all-things-considered misleading higher-order evidence can be generated in two ways. One is 
via misleading evidence about the evidential support relations – that is, how strongly the items in one’s 
evidence support different potential doxastic attitudes. The second is via misleading evidence about 
what one’s evidence is in the first place – that is, which propositions (or other items) are part of one’s 
evidence in the first place.40 But even if the evidential support relations are wholly a priori, it’s not 
(wholly) a priori which items are part of one’s evidence.41 Thus, the strong a priorist story can’t generalize 
to block all potential cases of all-things-considered misleading higher-order evidence. 
 
6. How to respond to evidence-coherence conflicts: misleading higher-order evidence cases 
 
Let’s now suppose that preface and/or misleading higher-order evidence cases are best-understood as 
conflicts of evidence and coherence. What then?  
 As I said earlier, evidence-coherence conflicts will only be dilemmas in the strict sense I defined 
if there is no answer as to whether, in such cases, it’s the evidential (substantive) requirements or the 
coherence (structural) requirements take precedence. In this section, I want to argue that, in cases of 
misleading higher-order evidence, there is such an answer: the structural requirement to avoid inter-
level incoherence takes precedence over the substantive requirement to take the doxastic attitudes that 
one’s evidence supports. This is because, as I will argue, in these cases the agent has an excuse for 
                                                 
39 Cf. Titelbaum (2015); Smithies (this volume). 
40 For some cases of all-things-considered misleading higher-order evidence generated by misleading evidence about 
what one’s evidence is, see Worsnip (2018). 
41 For example, suppose that, as Williamson (2000) contends, one’s evidence is one’s knowledge. If this is so, then one 
knows that some proposition is part of one’s evidence by knowing that one knows it. But it’s clearly not true that 
knowledge that one knows p is wholly a priori for all p – if one’s knowledge of p is a posteriori, typically one’s knowledge 
that one knows p is going to be at least partly a posteriori too. 
17 
 
violating the substantive requirements, but not for violating the structural one.42 I’ll offer two (closely 
related) arguments for this. 
 
6.1 The argument from unknowability of one’s predicament 
 
Here’s a crucial fact about cases of all-things-considered misleading higher-order evidence like 
Mabel’s: you cannot know that you are in such a case. For it’s part of what it is for evidence to be 
misleading that you don’t know it’s misleading.  
 Let me present this a little more precisely. Recall that, if Mabel’s case is a case of all-things-
considered misleading higher order evidence, then: 
 
(i) Mabel’s evidence supports believing that her evidence supports believing that the vicar did 
it; but 
(ii) Mabel’s evidence doesn’t support believing that the vicar did it. 
 
Suppose for reductio that Mabel knows that she is in such a situation; that is, that she knows (i) and 
(ii). Then, as well as (i) and (ii) holding, the following also hold: 
 
(iii) Mabel knows that her evidence supports believing that her evidence supports believing 
that the vicar did it; and  
(iv) Mabel knows that her evidence doesn’t support believing that the vicar did it. 
 
However, (i) and (iv) are not co-possible. This follows from the following general principle: 
 
No Knowledge Against Your Evidence. If your evidence supports believing p, then you can’t 
know not-p. 
 
Thus, it’s impossible for Mabel to know that she’s in a case of all-things-considered misleading higher-
order evidence. A similar argument will show that Mabel can’t justifiably believe that she’s in a case of 
all-things-considered misleading higher-order evidence, given the following principle: 
 
No Justified Belief Against Your Evidence. If your evidence supports believing p, then you 
can’t justifiably believe not-p. 
 
Now, here is what I think is another very plausible principle: 
 
                                                 
42 Excuses are distinct from justifications here. (Cf., inter alia, Fletcher 1985; Baron 2005; Williamson forthcoming.)  
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Unknowability Is an Excuse. If an agent could not have possibly known (or justifiably believed) 
that she was under some normative demand(s), then she has an excuse for failing to (fully) satisfy 
that/those demand(s).43 
 
Given this principle, it follows that since Mabel couldn’t have known that substantive rationality 
requires her both to believe that her evidence supports believing that the vicar did it, and to refrain 
from believing that the vicar did it, she has an excuse for failing to satisfy (both of) these demands.  
 By contrast, Mabel has no similar excuse for violating Inter-Level Coherence. This 
requirement applies to her under all circumstances, so she doesn’t need to know anything special about 
her circumstances to know that it applies to her here. And even if she doesn’t have the terminology 
of “structural irrationality” specifically, there’s no in-principle barrier to her knowing that there would 
be something incoherent and irrational about her believing that the evidence supports believing that 
the vicar did it, and yet not believing that the vicar did it.44  
 Thus, Mabel has an excuse for violating the substantive requirement, but not the structural 
requirement. The final principle we now need is the following: 
 
Excuses Resolve Dilemmas. If one is required to Ф, and one is required to Ψ (where these two 
requirements are not co-satisfiable), but one has an excuse for failing to Ф and no excuse for failing 
to Ψ, then there is a good sense in which one ought to Ψ rather than Ф. 
 
Given this, it follows that there’s a good sense in which Mabel ought to satisfy the requirement of 
structural rationality, rather than those of substantive rationality, when they conflict.45 Depending on 
how one wants to use the term ‘dilemma’, this either dissolve the dilemma that Mabel faces, or at the 
very least tells us how she ought to respond to it. 
 
6.2 The argument from the impossibility of ex post rationality 
 
Consider now the distinction between ex ante and ex post (substantive) rationality. On the standard 
account of this distinction, very roughly speaking, an attitude is ex ante substantively rational when 
your reasons support it (in the case of a doxastic attitude: when your evidence supports it), and ex post 
substantively rational when you hold the attitude in a way that constitutes properly responding to 
those very reasons (evidence) that support it. A belief can be ex ante rational without being ex post 
rational, but it can’t be ex post rational without being ex ante rational.  
Now, cases of all-things-considered misleading higher-order evidence are ones where your 
evidence supports incoherent attitudes. But what follows from this is that in such cases, it’s ex ante 
                                                 
43 This is much weaker than saying that mere ignorance of the normative demands one is under is an excuse (cf. e.g. 
Harman 2011). One can be ignorant of a demand for all sorts of reasons other than the fact that one couldn’t possibly have 
known that one was under it. 
44 Nor can she justifiably believe that this is OK because she’s in a case of misleading higher-order evidence, since, as we’ve just 
seen, she can’t know or justifiably believe that she’s in a case of misleading higher-order evidence. 
45 Here I’m assuming that there’s a good sense in which one ought to satisfy the requirements of structural rationality in 
the first place. See Worsnip (forthcoming: ch. 8) for a treatment of this issue. 
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substantively rational to have incoherent attitudes. It does not follow from this that in such a case, 
you can have these incoherent attitudes and be ex post substantively rational in so doing.  
In fact, Paul Silva (2017) has compellingly argued that you cannot. Here is an argument 
inspired by his. Suppose that Mabel believes, ex ante and ex post rationally, that her evidence (decisively) 
supports believing that the vicar did it. In that case, she believes that her evidence does not permit 
suspending judgment about whether the vicar did it. But the following principle is plausible: 
 
Contrary Judgments Preclude Proper Responses. If an agent believes that her reasons do 
not permit Ф-ing, then even if her reasons do permit Ф-ing, she can’t Ф in a way that constitutes 
properly responding to her reasons (so as to be ex post substantively rational in Ф-ing). 
 
To see the case for Contrary Judgments Preclude Proper Responses, consider the following. Properly 
responding to some reason for Ф-ing, in such a way as to be ex post rational, doesn’t just require Ф-ing 
on the basis of some reason, R, that supports Ф-ing.46 Suppose that the fact that you promised to meet 
me for lunch is a decisive reason to show up. And suppose this is so in virtue of its being morally 
required for you to keep your promises. But suppose that you instead think it’s a decisive reason to 
show because you, falsely and irrationally, believe that anyone who fails to keep a promise will at some 
point later in their life be hit by a tornado. If you then go on to show up to lunch, even if you do so 
in a good sense on the basis of your having promised to do so, you don’t count as having properly 
responded to your reason for doing so; nor does your showing up count as ex post rational. What is 
also needed is some sufficient degree of understanding of why your promise counts in favor of showing 
up. More generally, properly responding to a reason R for Ф-ing requires not just Ф-ing on the basis 
of R but having some degree of understanding of why R supports Ф-ing. But you can’t understand why 
your reasons support Ф-ing if you yourself believe they don’t even permit Ф-ing. From this, Contrary 
Judgments Preclude Proper Responses follows. 
Apply this to Mabel’s case: since Mabel herself believes that suspending judgment is the wrong 
attitude to have given her evidence, by Contrary Judgments Preclude Proper Responses, she can’t be 
suspending judgment in a way that constitutes properly responding to her substantive reasons to 
suspend judgment. And so she is not ex post (substantively) rational in suspending judgment.47 Thus, 
if Mabel has the higher-order attitude that substantive rationality requires her to have, then she can’t 
be ex post rational in holding the first-order attitude that substantive rationality requires her to have.48 
Thus, she cannot be ex post rational in holding both attitudes. 
                                                 
46 Cf. Singh (ms.). 
47 I see no reason to deny that suspended judgment admits of the ex ante/ex post rationality distinction. As Friedman 
(2013) has influentially argued, suspended judgment is not merely absence of belief but an attitude in its own right. And 
even when one’s reasons favor suspending judgment, one can either suspend judgment for the reasons that favor it, or 
for unrelated, bad (motivational) reasons. 
48 Some may want to put the point by saying that the ex post rationality of Mabel’s state of suspending judgment about 
whether the vicar did it is defeated by her higher-order belief. I don’t object to this way of talking, but it’s important not to 
confuse the contention here with the claim (already discussed and criticized in fn. 37 above) that Mabel’s higher-order 
evidence defeats her ex ante justification for suspending judgment about whether the vicar did it in a way that makes 
believing that proposition positively substantively rational. 
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 Silva himself thinks that this appeal to ex post justification “dissolves the puzzle of misleading 
higher-order evidence”, and that in particular it gets rid of the sense that such cases are dilemmatic in 
any troubling way. But for all that has been said so far, it’s not clear why this should be so. Indeed, 
one might think that the above points actually secure a way of presenting the dilemma without even 
appealing to any requirement of structural rationality. For consider Mabel’s options with respect to 
the proposition that the vicar did it. By hypothesis, her evidence doesn’t support believing this 
proposition, or disbelieving it (i.e. believing its negation). Assuming, as is standard, that an attitude is 
ex post rational only if it’s ex ante rational, this means that neither of these attitudes are ex post 
substantively rational. But if the argument from the last paragraph is right, then (at least if she has the 
higher-order attitudes that it’s substantively rational to have) she also can’t be ex post substantively 
rational in suspending judgment about this proposition. So it seems like, whatever attitude Mabel takes 
toward the proposition that the vicar did it, it will fail to be ex post substantively rational. 
 However, again, I think there is a plausible principle about excuses that can be invoked here to 
soothe the dilemma: 
 
Impossibility of Rationally Responding is an Excuse. If there is no possible way for one to 
comply with an (ex ante) demand of (substantive) rationality in such a way as to be ex post 
(substantively) rational, then one has an excuse for failing to satisfy this demand of (substantive) 
rationality. 
 
If this is right – and again, I think it is very plausible – then Mabel has an excuse for failing to satisfy 
the substantive requirement to suspend judgment about whether the vicar did it.49 Again, she has no 
similar excuse for failing to satisfy the requirement of inter-level coherence. Indeed, it’s not clear that 
the ex ante/ex post distinction makes sense for structural rationality. A response is ex post rational, 
roughly, if constitutes a correct response to the reasons that make the response ex ante rational. But 
since structural rationality isn’t about responding to reasons, it’s unclear how to apply the distinction 
to structural rationality. So again, by Excuses Resolve Dilemmas, Mabel ought to satisfy the 
requirement of structural rationality rather than the requirement of substantive rationality here.  
 Interestingly, this second argument allows us to be a bit more precise about the response that 
Mabel ought to have in her case. Assuming that the requirement of inter-level coherence is “wide-
scope,”50 there are two ways for Mabel to satisfy it: 
 
a) {Believe that her evidence supports believing that the vicar did it, believe that the vicar did it}; 
b) {Not believe that her evidence supports believing that the vicar did it, not believe that the 
vicar did it} 
 
                                                 
49 And, if (as is plausible) it’s not an option for Mabel to have no attitude whatsoever towards the proposition that the vicar 
did it – not even suspending judgment – then she likewise has an excuse for failing to satisfy the requirement not to 
believe that the vicar is guilty.  
50 Again, see e.g. Broome (2004). 
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The Argument from the Unknowability of One’s Predicament seemed to be neutral on these two 
options. But the Argument from the Impossibility of Ex Post Rationality is not. Of the two things that 
substantive rationality requires of Mabel – believing that her evidence supports believing that the vicar 
did it, and suspending judgment about whether the vicar did it – it is specifically the latter attitude that 
Mabel can’t have ex post rationally in light of the former, not the reverse. This suggests that she has an 
excuse for failing to suspend judgment about whether the vicar did it, but no excuse for failing to 
believe that her evidence supports believing that the vicar did it. This suggests that Mabel has an 
excuse for violating the requirement of substantive rationality in the way involved in option (a), but 
not for violating it in the way involved in option (b), and thus that she in a good sense ought to adopt 
the attitudes in option (a). 
 
6.3 Why only an excuse? 
 
Someone might now ask: why only say that the foregoing considerations show that one has an excuse 
for violating the requirements of substantive rationality in cases of all-things-considered misleading 
higher-order evidence? Why not take them to show something stronger, namely that there is no 
requirement of substantive rationality that one would be violating by having structurally rational 
attitudes in these cases? This would seem to follow if we replace the principles Unknowability Is an 
Excuse and/or Impossibility of Rationally Responding Is an Excuse with the following stronger 
principles: 
 
Luminosity. An agent is under some normative demands(s) only if it is possible for her to know 
(or justifiably believe) that she is under these demand(s). 
 
Rational Respondability. An agent is ex ante substantively required to Ф only if it possible for 
her to Ф ex post rationally. 
 
If these principles are true, then not only would the cases turn out not to be dilemmas (in my strong 
sense) – they wouldn’t even turn out to be conflicts between substantive and structural rationality at 
all.51 
 I am skeptical about Luminosity and Rational Respondability. Addressing them directly, 
though, is a task beyond the confines of this essay.52 So I will make do with pointing out how 
revisionary the result would be if we apply these principles in cases of all-things-considered misleading 
higher-order evidence. Specifically, the result would be to say that substantive rationality no longer 
requires us to take the doxastic attitudes that our evidence supports in such cases. If correct, this 
would be a result of immense significance. I leave it to philosophers to decide which they would rather 
hang on to: the claim that substantive rationality requires us to take the doxastic attitudes that our 
                                                 
51 Though they’d still be conflicts between evidence and coherence in a good sense. They would just be cases where 
substantive rationality doesn’t require one to have the attitudes supported by one’s evidence. 
52 For skeptical perspectives on Luminosity, see, inter alia, Hawthorne & Srinivasan (2013) and Srinivasan (2015). 
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evidence supports, or principles like Luminosity and Rational Responsibility. If there are cases of all-
things-considered misleading higher-order evidence, they cannot have both. 
 
7. Why this doesn’t work for preface cases 
 
As we have seen, there is a nice story about why, in conflict cases generated by misleading higher-
order evidence, the demands of structural rationality take precedence. It would be nice if this story 
generalized to preface cases. 
 Unfortunately, it doesn’t seem to do so. This is because the considerations about 
unknowability and ex post rationality that applied in misleading higher-order evidence cases do not 
apply in preface cases. Suppose that preface cases do constitute conflict cases. Unlike in the case of 
misleading higher-order evidence, there is nothing to prevent you, in principle, from knowing that 
you’re in a preface case, and that you’re under conflicting demands in such a case. You might know 
that each of the individual propositions {p1, p2, … pn} is highly probable, and that the negation of 
their conjunction is highly probable. If we’re required to believe propositions that exceed some 
threshold of proposition, you could also in principle know this, and thus know that substantive 
rationality requires you to believe inconsistent propositions in the preface case. But still, you could 
also know in principle that it’s structurally irrational to do so. 
 Slightly more arguably, it seems possible to respond to the demands of substantive rationality 
in an ex post rational way in preface cases. You could believe each proposition {p1, p2, … pn} on the 
basis of its being highly probable on your evidence, and likewise for the negation of the conjunction. 
This would seem to suffice for ex post substantive rationality in each belief.  
Now, someone might claim that if you believe {p1, p2, … pn}, that thereby precludes your 
belief in the negation of their conjunction from being ex post substantively rational. This is an intriguing 
claim. Effectively, this view says that believing something on the basis of the considerations that make 
it ex ante rational does not suffice for ex post rationality. If this can be vindicated, then perhaps we have 
a way of running a version of The Argument from the Impossibility of Ex Post Rationality to show 
that the structural requirement against inconsistent beliefs takes place in the preface case. But this is a 
major task to execute. Thus, it’s at least more complicated whether preface-type conflict cases can be 
handled in the way that I suggested we handle misleading higher-order evidence cases. If they cannot 
be – and if, as I’ve been supposing for the sake of argument, preface cases really are best-understood 




Let us take stock. I argued in §§4-5 that preface cases and misleading higher-order evidence cases are 
both plausibly diagnosed as conflict cases, but that there are also ways to resist these diagnoses. 
However, I also argued that the most plausible alternative diagnoses of these cases still end up putting 
pressure on monism about rationality, just as strongly as a diagnosis of the cases as conflict cases 
would. Thus, one conclusion of this chapter is that these cases put strong pressure on monism about 
rationality – even if the diagnosis of such cases as conflict cases can be resisted. 
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 In §§6-7, I took up the question of whether, assuming these cases are best understood as 
conflict cases, they are dilemmas in a stronger sense: where a conflict involves being under conflicting 
requirements, and a dilemma involves being in a situation where there’s no fact of the matter about 
which of the thing conflict requirements one ought, all-things-considered, to satisfy. I gave two 
arguments – the Argument from Unknowability, and the Argument from the Impossibility of Rational 
Respondability – for the view that misleading higher-order evidence cases, even if best-understood as 
conflict cases, are not dilemmas in this stronger sense. But I also noted that these arguments don’t 
seem to extend to preface cases. So, if preface cases are best understood as conflict cases, it is hard to 
see how to avoid concluding that they are also dilemmas. 
 How should we react to this? A crucial point here is that preface cases (as I’ve defined them) 
are not just recherché cases that arise for certain historians writing a certain kind of preface to a certain 
kind of book. Rather, we are all in cases with preface-like structures right now. All that is required to 
be in such a case is to have a non-trivial number of beliefs, for propositions for which we have 
credence at least somewhat short of 1, in propositions that are at least somewhat independent. Once 
those conditions are met, the conjunction of all these propositions will be extremely improbable, and 
that raises the question of whether to believe the (extremely probable) negation of this conjunction. 
On the conflict diagnosis of the case, to believe it would make one structurally rational, but to refrain 
from believing it would make one substantively irrational.  
 But one may feel queasy about this diagnosis. Our predicament as believers is that we need to 
believe a fairly large number of things, about a range of (somewhat independent) subject matters, and 
that we can rarely be absolutely certain of any of these things. But that just is to satisfy the conditions 
for the conflict diagnosis to kick in. Thus, this diagnosis seems to say that we’re all guaranteed to be 
irrational merely in virtue of our predicament as believers.53 That is a lot to swallow.  
For my own part, I feel at least tempted to diagnose preface cases not as conflict cases but as 
what I earlier called permissive (counterexample) cases, where the thought is that substantive rationality 
permits, but doesn’t require, us to believe the (highly probable) negation of the conjunction of one’s 
beliefs – whereas structural rationality forbids having such a belief (while continuing to hold on to 
one’s other beliefs). This still blocks the guarantee hypothesis, thus putting pressure on monism, but 
it does so without counting us as irrational merely in virtue of our predicament as believers. But it is 
kosher to adopt this diagnosis merely on the basis of wanting to avoid that latter result? That is a 
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